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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL JAMES F. LEMON  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. WILLIAM VITALE  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Energy

Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency


REAR ADMIRAL JOHN BITOFF  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. WILLIAM STAPLES  
Executive Secretary  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

MR. RONALD J. POST  
Acting Chief of the the Executive Secretariat  
U. S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Talking Points on US Interim Restraint  
and SALT I/II Decision

The President has approved the attached talking points for  
general use on the May 27 Interim Restraint decision.

  
Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
As stated

June 16, 1986

TALKING POINTSUS INTERIM RESTRAINT, SALT I/II DECISION

On May 27 the President announced that the United States can no longer continue to support a flawed SALT structure which we have scrupulously supported but which Soviet violations have seriously undercut in spite of repeated US requests for corrective Soviet action.

- The President's basic message is that both sides need to build a new foundation of mutual restraint and sound arms reductions agreements.
- The President seeks to substitute a truly mutual framework of restraint for one that was not working and was increasingly obsolete. The President's highest priority is a new foundation based on the achievement of significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms -- as we have proposed at the Geneva negotiations.

US and Allied security, as well as the integrity of the arms control process are fundamentally threatened by uncorrected Soviet violations and the continuing unparalleled Soviet military buildup.

- SALT II and SALT I codified very major buildups. They counted launchers, and limited weapons only indirectly. Since SALT I was signed in 1972, the Soviets have quadrupled their strategic weapons (warheads and bombs) to about 10,000 now. Since SALT II was signed in 1979, the Soviets have nearly doubled their strategic ballistic missile warheads from about 5,000 to over 9,000. We project that with SALT II, they were already planning to add many more weapons, and that they would probably not deploy an appreciably greater number in the absence of SALT. The SALT structure has not reduced the Soviet buildup.
- SALT II is history. It was unratified and would have expired in December, 1985, had it been ratified. SALT I expired in 1977.
- Both agreements have been undercut by Soviet violations, including Soviet SALT II breaches exceeding the Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDV) numerical limit, deployment of a second prohibited ICBM, and encryption in a manner impeding verification. SALT I has also been violated and we are also concerned about Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty of 1972 and other major arms control agreements.

Given the lack of restraint by Soviets, we cannot continue dismantling systems on the basis of some ineffective limit. The US will therefore base future decisions about our own strategic forces on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and on the need to maintain a credible strategic deterrent, rather than on standards contained in the flawed and

expired SALT II and SALT I agreements, which the Soviets are violating.

- We intend to deploy the 131st heavy bomber with ALCMs toward the end of this year without undertaking compensatory dismantlement under SALT II. As we implement our Strategic Modernization Program, final decisions concerning possible retirement of individual US systems have not been made. These specific decisions will be based on our national security needs, judged in light of Soviet actions and our military and economic judgments, and not based on SALT provisions.
- While we continue our SDI research program to seek a better way to deter aggression over long term, modernizing our strategic forces through the full Strategic Modernization Program is our highest strategic requirement to assure our deterrent and as an incentive to serious negotiations.
- Congressional action cutting these vital programs would seriously jeopardize our national security and would send precisely the wrong signal to the Soviets. It would greatly reduce Soviet incentives to correct their noncompliance, reverse their strategic buildup, and engage constructively in the arms reduction negotiations.

The President has made clear that as we implement the Strategic Modernization Program, the US will continue to exercise utmost restraint. We will seek to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for a continued Soviet buildup.

- For example, we will retire older forces as our security permits and, assuming no significant change in the threat we face, we will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.

It is not a matter of whether SALT is "dead" or "alive." We will continue to exercise restraint. What is needed is for the Soviets to exercise comparable restraint.

- As the President has emphasized, we continue to seek constructive Soviet action. It is essential that they correct their noncompliance, reverse their strategic arms buildup, and work seriously with us to make real progress in Geneva. If they do so, we will certainly take that into account.
- We continue to hope that the Soviet Union will implement the agreement reached by General Secretary Gorbachev and the President to seek common ground at the Geneva negotiations and for a summit visit by General Secretary Gorbachev to the United States later this year.